By Andy Kerr and Rick Brown
The battle for the
federal forests of the Pacific Northwest has gone
on for nearly a century, but of late it has been
red hot. Since the first court injunction against
timber sales in Northern Spotted Owl habitat in
1989 until the retirement of Senator Mark
Hatfield and the expiration of the Salvage Rider
at the end of 1996, the region has seen
unprecedented lawsuits, demonstrations, arrests,
media attention, government action, death threats
and political action for and against forests.
The purpose of this
article is not to tell this story, as others have
told parts of it already (start with Kathie
Durbin's Tree Huggers: Victory, Defeat &
Renewal in the Northwest Ancient Forest Campaign,
The Mountaineers, Seattle, 1996), and remaining
pieces will be told in time. Rather, we wish to
examine the present state of affairs and
expectations to finish the epic struggle for the
public forests of the western Pacific Northwest
(Northern Spotted Owl range, not the drier
eastside forests). We answer the questions:
How much
forest has been saved?
Is the
President's Northwest Forest Plan (Option 9)
good, bad, and/or ugly?
What's next
to finish the job?
How Much Forest
Has Been Saved?
If one properly defines
saved as the goal set by former
Oregon Natural Resources Council executive
director and Western Ancient Forest Campaign
founder James Monteith in the mid-1980s as
permanent legislative protection,
then precious little has been saved.
Scientists estimate that about two-thirds of the
pre-settlement forests were late
successional (which includes forests down
to 80 years old), or perhaps 26 million out of 40
million acres of forested land within the range
of the Northern Spotted Owl. Optimistic agency
inventories suggest that one-third of this--8.5
million acres--remained by the early 1990s, and
only 2.4 million was protected in Wilderness and
National Parks. Since the oldest and biggest
trees were cut first, the widely accepted
estimate that no more than 10% of original, true
old growth forest remains is quite
reasonable.
Depending on which
definition and which maps of ancient (or
old-growth or late-successional) forests are
used, estimates vary widely--perhaps from 45% to
75%--as to how much of otherwise unprotected
forest is protected under Option 9.
As the Salvage Rider demonstrated, the
administrative protections established in Option
9 can be overridden at Congress's whim. Neither
environmentalists nor the timber industry has had
the power to get the permanent legislation they
wanted out of Congress.
On the plus side, two
small, but highly critical Oregon areas have
recently received permanent legislative
protection. In the closing moments of the 104th
Congress, Senator Hatfield, the person most
singularly responsible for the destruction of the
region's forests, pushed through a bill to
permanently protect from logging the City of
Portland's Bull Run Watershed (65,000 acres) and
Opal Creek (28,000 acres variously designated as
Wilderness, Wild and Scenic River, and Scenic
Recreation Area). Hatfield acted in an inadequate
attempt to mitigate his clearcut legacy. While
the timber industry hasn't fulfilled its fantasy
of permanently legislating away the protections
of the National Forest Management Act and the
Endangered Species Act or the processes of the
National Environmental Policy Act, it has
achieved temporary suspensions of the
environmental laws as applied to Pacific
Northwest forests in 1989-90 and 1995-96 by
attaching provisions to must-pass annual
appropriations bills. These riders
(non-germane amendments) limited citizens' access
to the courts to enforce environmental statutes.
(Ironically, the provisions that saved Bull Run
and Opal Creek were also riders.)
While few forests have
been permanently saved, the amount
being lost to logging has declined
dramatically. Figure 1 depicts cutting levels
from 1980 to 1996. The upward bumps against the
overall downward trend are due to the riders.
| Figure 1. |
- Timber sale levels
on federal forests range
of the Northern Spotted Owl
- Oregon,
Washington, and California
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- LEGEND
- 1980-88: Average
sale levels for 1960s and 1970s
were very similar.
- 1989: Fist of
several court injunctions takes
effect.
- 1990:
Appropriations bill Section 318
"Rider From Hell"
forces sales despite injunctions.
- 1991: Injunctions
resume effect, with some
carry-over of Sec. 318.
- 1992-93:
Injunctions continue in effect.
- 1994-94: Option 9
begins to take effect.
- 1996: Public Law
104 19 "Salvage rider"
in effect.
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Prior to the first court
injunction in 1989, 5 billion board feet (BBF)
per year (three square miles of federal forest
each week) was being logged. A billion board feet
translates to 200,000 log trucks. Before the
injunction on the Mount Hood National Forest, for
instance, logs came off the Forest at a rate
equivalent to a truck-load every six minutes, 24
hours per day, no holidays.
While the President's
Northwest Forest Plan (Option 9) made it much
more difficult to log the federal forests, the
single best indicator both of forest destruction
and of environmentalists' success and failure
continues to be the amount of timber cut despite
environmentalists' best efforts.
Is the
President's Northwest Forest Plan Good, Bad,
and/or Ugly?
It's political, so it's
all of the above. The earlier plans issued by the
federal forest agencies were also political, but
the President's political needs were different
than the agencies'.
The President's plan
purports to consider and protect over 1000
species. This is an unprecedented attempt in
conservation biology. However, the plan is built
around the Northern Spotted Owl and Marbled
Murrelet (both protected under the Endangered
Species Act) and various stocks of Pacific salmon
(several are listed, several others are proposed
for listing, under the ESA); other species mostly
benefit coincidentally.
Politically, no federal
forest plan has done more. The amount of land (in
absolute acres and relative fractions) withdrawn
from scheduled logging is unprecedented.
Unfortunately, it is not
enough ecologically. As politically
precedent-setting as it is, the plan tolerates
unacceptable levels of risk for species. None of
the original eight options would cut an amount of
timber considered politically adequate, hence
Option 9.
The favored option was
developed to cut at least 1.1 BBF of timber
annually. To do so, optimistic assumptions about
the ecological compatibility of new logging
techniques, generally known as new
forestry (kinder and gentler clearcuts),
were made. The plan has both loopholes big enough
to drive log trucks through and time-bombs big
enough to blow up most--but not quite all--log
trucks. The amount of timber that gets through
will turn on politics, budgets, enforcement and
vigilance.
To keep projected
logging levels above 1 BBF, the plan defers many
decisions to the future. Depending on the success
of environmentalists in monitoring the plan, and
forcing its full implementation (all the while
seeking to replace it with a stronger, adequate
plan), the plan could allow as much as 1.1 BBF to
be sold annually, or perhaps as little as 0.1 BBF
(the amount which could be cut if all the old
growth is saved) or 0.4 BBF (the amount logged
during the injunctions protecting Spotted Owl
habitat).
To keep cutting levels
up, Option 9 calls for logging a substantial
portion of the old growth that is left. Judge
William Dwyer, who imposed most of the owl
injunctions, found the plan to be legal,
but just barely. To support the high logging
levels, the plan calls for unprecedented levels
of monitoring, inventory, and mitigation.
Option 9 is as much a
bureaucrat's dream as it is a taxpayer's
nightmare. Selling far less timber will cost more
tax money than previously. In a 1996 report to
Congress, the USDA Office of Forestry and
Economic Assistance admits: Although the
timber sale rate has been reduced, the amount of
staff and financial effort to re-establish the
new program is comparable to what was needed to
run the full timber program.
If all the monitoring
and mitigation is done as required, it will
result in less timber being sold. Even using the
bogus accounting methods of the Forest Service,
where the liquidation of inventory (big old
trees) is posted as profit, federal forests
within the range of the Spotted Owl now join the
rest of the US National Forests in being money
losers.
Budgets are not going
up, so it is almost certain the federal forest
agencies will fail to do what the plan requires,
if for no other reason than a lack of money.
Consider the standpoint
of the timber industry. They used to expend X
amount of effort (lobbying, schmoozing,
threatening, contributing, etc.) for Y amount of
timber. They now must expend 10X for possibly
1/10Y. The smart ones are getting out and moving
to private lands or non-wood fiber resources.
The hope left to the
timber industry is that Option 9, while making it
much more difficult to log, depending on the land
allocation, still offers the potential. The
federal forest agencies prefer the logging option
because so much of their budget comes from timber
sale receipts. The only people saying they
believe the full 1.1 BBF can be produced are
administration and agency officials speaking
publicly.
Complicating the
implementation of Option 9 and environmentalists'
attempts to thwart it was the enactment by
Congress of the salvage logging rider
which prohibited citizens from holding lawless
federal forest agencies accountable in court. The
rider expired in 1996 and is unlikely to be
renewed. The main driving force for this and all
other logging riders has retired. Senator
Hatfield routinely sought to (ab)use his power as
chair or ranking minority member of the
Appropriations (money talks) Committee to advance
the timber industry's agenda. The timber industry
still has friends on the Appropriations Committee
to do their bidding, but they are less powerful
than Hatfield was and less willing to expend
political capital for the cause of clearcuts.
What's Next To
Finish the Job
Now that the rider has
expired and the 105th Congress is seated,
environmentalists are back on track.
If the federal forest
agencies don't follow the plan, they'll end up in
court.
Or, if they ignore new
scientific information demonstrating the need to
revise the present plan, they'll end up in court.
The owl's populations
are still declining (and the rate of decline is
increasing) and should be reclassified from
threatened to endangered.
The President's plan anticipated, and indeed
called for, a continued decline; but the plan
assumes that as habitat recovers (cut-over lands
become old forests again), the owl will recover
with it. To achieve the political necessity of
keeping the cut above 1 billion board feet, the
agencies propose to drive the owl closer to, but
not over, the brink. Environmentalists and
scientists do not share the agencies' confidence
in their ability to precisely predict where this
brink occurs.
More stocks of declining
salmon will also be listed, which should require
stronger forest protections.
Option 9 was a species
conservation plan, not a municipal watershed
protection plan. About two-thirds of Pacific
Northwesterners get their drinking water from
surface sources, primarily federal forests.
Option 9 calls for logging in municipal
watersheds, yet some municipalities are now
calling for an end to logging in their
watersheds. One such is Salem, Oregon, whose
watershed comprises most of the Detroit Ranger
District of the Willamette National Forest. A
decade ago, no ranger district anywhere logged
more. Oregon US Senator Ron Wyden has called upon
the Administration to strengthen the President's
Northwest Forest Plan by fully protecting all
municipal drinking water supplies from logging
and roading. In addition, general water quality
concerns may limit logging further, as many of
the watersheds have been severely hammered
already and are in need of recovery.
The intentional tension
between the National Environmental Policy Act
(which requires the agencies to tell the truth)
and the National Forest Management Act (which
requires them to conserve species) will likely
continue, as will listings under the Endangered
Species Act (which requires them to protect
listed species).
Environmentalists should
advocate permanent legislative protection in two
major forms: municipal drinking water protection
and salmonid habitat conservation and
restoration. In combination, these measures would
protect essentially all the remaining ancient
forest. Our ability to achieve such permanent
legislative protection has increased, even with
the Republican takeover of Congress, because
timber levels have already dropped due to
administrative and judicial actions. Legislative
action would simply make it permanent.
Legislating a fait accompli is always easier than
legislating change, especially since Hatfield no
longer wields a chainsaw in Congress.
In addition to seeking
permanent legislative protection for forests,
environmentalists must seek new ways to fund the
federal forest agencies. The present system of
funding much of their budgets through timber sale
receipts leads the agencies to advocate timber
sales to save the salmon, save the watershed,
save the forest, save the campground, or save the
whatever, but in reality to save the bureaucracy.
For various
administrative, economic, and social reasons,
federal forest cutting levels in the western
Pacific Northwest are moving toward statistically
(and economically, but not ecologically)
insignificant amounts, if not zero. The challenge
to environmentalists is to see that this occurs
before the last of the big trees are logged.
Andy Kerr is retired
after 20 years with the Oregon Natural Resources
Council. Rick Brown is a resource specialist for
the National Wildlife Federation.
Kerr, Andy and Rick Brown. 1997. "The
Bottom Line on Option 9." Wild Earth.
Vol. 7, No. 2. Summer. 31-34.
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